- In Q12023, we analysed 130 malicious activities of interest targeting EU institutions, bodies, and agencies (EUIBAs) or their vicinity, and we released 49 Threat Alerts
- When known, the main motive of the attackers was cyberespionage 46% of the cases. Cyberespionage attacks were, in all likelihood, carried out by threat actors highly likely originating from Russia & China
- Government, transportation & diplomatic sectors = the 3 most targeted sectors
- We noticed active exploitation of vulnerabilities (as zero-day or n-day) in at least 15 software products likely used by EUIBAs: Microsoft Outlook & IIS, Fortinet appliances, Zoho ManageEngine, Zimbra, and VMWare ESXi
- We also observed breaches affecting at least 6 |T companies actually or possibly servicing EUIBAs





- 19 threat actors had been active against EUIBAs or in their vicinity
- 7 likely of Russian origin, 5 of likely Chinese origin
- There was sustained spearphishing activity by two Top Threat Actors – highly likely Russia–linked and China–linked. They focused on the diplomatic sectors
- Finally, we observed the emergence of two little known, but dangerous threat actors named Winter Vivern & Dark Pink





- We detected significant active scanning, from a known set of infrastructure associated by trusted partners with Chinese threat actors
- We also observed adversaries spoofing EUIBAs or public administrations of EU countries in attempts to lure constituents in phishing attacks
- In a likely cybercrime activity, several EUIBAs reported on attempted delivery of malware disguised as Microsoft OneNote documents
- In our constituency, the most active malware families were Agent Tesla a major information stealer, Ave Maria - an information stealer and keylogger, SocGolish - used for initial access, and Qbot a.k.a Qakbot - a network-aware worm with backdoor capabilities



